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28 May 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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OK
Communist China - US: Peiping is using its "100th serious warning" to step up charges that "military provocations" are a deliberate American policy. Linking the U-2 incident with Peiping's own alleged grievances, a People's Daily editorial on 27 May bitterly condemns the US. It makes no specific threat of retaliatory action but warns that "accounts will be settled some day!"

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*Iran: [The success of the military coup in Turkey might encourage Iranians opposed to the Shah's personal rule to attempt a similar action. There does not appear to be any civilian group well enough organized to undertake a coup]

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The parliamentary elections scheduled for July, if they are as blatantly rigged as now appears probable, will greatly increase public dissatisfaction with the Shah and might also serve as a pretext for a move against the government.]

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India: [The government has requested that the United States sell it Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Previous reports had indicated India was negotiating with Britain for the more costly Firestreak missile, but as yet no agreement is known to have been concluded. Indian interest in maintaining at least parity with Pakistan in air defense systems, heretofore a compelling motive in Indian defensive measures, may in this case be overshadowed by growing Indian concern over Chinese Communist intentions following the failure of the Nehru-Chou talks in April.]

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OK
South Korea: Acting Chief of State Huh Chung may find it difficult to maintain orderly processes of government with the approach of new National Assembly elections which are expected to be held this July. Although Huh appears determined to prevent irresponsible retaliatory action against government personnel, exploitation

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of popular resentments against the Rhee regime by political opportunists might force Huh to expand the purge of civil and military officials who are tainted by association with the old regime. Such action would seriously hamper normal government activities, increase army factionalism, and invite new political unrest. (Page 6)

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Peiping Issues "100th Serious Warning" Against US "Intrusions"

Communist China, to justify its bitter antagonism against the United States, on 26 May summed up its long list of "serious warnings." Since 7 September 1958 when the first "warning" was issued, formalized protests charging "intrusion" by US planes or ships have been routinely recorded in the Communist press. On 26 May, however, the Chinese propaganda media used the "100th serious warning," issued the day before, as an excuse to consolidate the accusations and cite them as "evidence" that the US follows a policy of deliberate military provocation.

There has been no discernible pattern to the frequency with which "warnings" have been issued and, on 26 May, a Chinese commentator said the "intrusions far exceed the warnings issued." The recent spate of complaints, however, suggests the Chinese were anxious to reach the 100th complaint in order to use it as a summation point while Peiping's alleged grievances could borrow some air of credibility from publicity surrounding the U-2 incident. A People's Daily editorial on 27 May linked "intrusions over Soviet territory" with similar "criminal acts against China" in an attempt to document the Chinese position that the US "will never change its character"--a line emphasized in recent criticism of Khrushchev's policy toward the West. People's Daily pointedly remarks that the Chinese people entertain no "unrealistic illusions regarding US imperialism."

The People's Daily editorial makes no specific threat of retaliatory action against US air or surface units nor does it threaten Chinese Nationalist positions. "Accounts will be settled some day," the editorial concludes.

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South Korean Situation

South Korean Acting Chief of State Huh Chung may find it increasingly difficult to maintain orderly processes of government with the approach of new National Assembly elections expected to be held in July. Ambassador McConaughy in Seoul has noted that raking up of old scandals involving persons formerly--and in some cases still--prominent in the government has increased and seems likely to grow. Although Huh appears determined to prevent irresponsible retaliatory action against government personnel, exploitation by political opportunists of popular resentment against the Rhee regime might force Huh to expand the purge of civil and military officials tainted by association with the old regime.

Encouraged by the new air of political freedom, a number of small leftist and neo-fascist parties have sprung to life. As a result of public charges by the leader of one such group that Rhee personally engineered the death of at least two past political opponents, a leading newspaper has called for Rhee's exile. Officials of the conservative Democratic party have publicly stated that Rhee should be tried if the charges are valid. An increase in such muckraking with the approach of the elections could cripple normal government activities, increase army factionalism, and invite new political unrest.

Huh, recognizing the stabilizing role of the army, announced in conjunction with the recent resignation of army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan that investigation of military commanders involved in the 15 March election frauds would be discontinued. However, alleged maneuvering by former National Youth Corps leader Yi Pom-sok to win army support could provoke further army factionalism. Yi, [redacted] appears to have some scattered support among military officers, and he may hope to use the army to come to power in the event there is a breakdown in civil government. [redacted]

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